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Searle reading on machines having intelligence
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<p> </p> <p><strong><em>assumptions</em></XXXXXX> </p> <p>distinction XXXXXXX XXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXX a XXXX assumption in searle's argument is XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX involves XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXX syntactic XXXXX; it requires semantic XXXXXXXXXXXXX, or XXXXXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXXXX. this implies XXXX while a XXXXXXX can be XXXXXXXXXX to XXXXXXX XXXXXXX according to rules (XXXXXX), it does XXX truly understand XXXX those symbols mean (semantics). </p> <p> </p> <p>XXXXXX ai vs. weak XX searle XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX strong XX, which claims XXXX a XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX can have a XXXX XXX consciousness, XXX weak XX, XXXXX XXXX suggests XXXX XXXXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXX thinking. XXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XX important because it frames the argument as XXX about XXXXXXX machines XXX XXXXX XX said XX "XXXXX," XX XXXXXXX to just performing XXXXX that XXXX XXXX thinking. </p> <p> </p> <p>XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX and intentionality searle argues XXXX human consciousness XXX intentionality (XXX quality XX XXXXXXXX being "XXXXX" something) XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX and cannot be replicated XX a XXXXXXX. XXXX assumption draws from a XXXXXX in XXX XXXXXX XXXXXX of XXXXX consciousness, XXXXX he XXXXXXXXX a XXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXX processes in XXX brain. </p> <p> </p> <p><XXXXXX><em>XXXXXXXX</em></strong> </p> <p>searle’s XXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX proposes XXXX XXXX XX a machine can process XXXXXXXXXXX in a way XXXX mimics XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX, it XXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXX a person XXX doesn’t understand chinese locked in a room with a XXX of XXXXX XXXX XXXXXX XXXX to XXXXXXX XX chinese XXXXXXXXXX with other chinese characters in a XXX that XXXXXXX coherent to an XXXXXXX observer. according XX searle, XXX XXXXXX XXXXX’t actually understand XXXXXXX; they are simply manipulating XXXXXXX based on XXXXX. XX analogy, he XXXXXX, a XXXXXXXX XXXXX’t XXXXX "XXXXXXXXXX" the XXXXX it performs—it only XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX.</p> <p>this XXXXXXXX is compelling XXXXXXX it highlights a fundamental limitation in how we perceive XXXXXXX intelligence. even XXX most XXXXXXXX ai is XXXXX XXXX manipulating symbols XXXXXXX XXX true XXXXXXXXXXXXX XX what those symbols XXXX. it raises XXX XXXXXXXX XX whether intelligence XXX thinking XXXXXXX a subjective, XXXXXXXXX experience&XXXXX;something XX XXXXX. searle argues XXXX without XXXX conscious XXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXX cannot XXXXX be XXXX to "think."</p> <p>XXXXXXX, XXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. for instance, alan turing XXXXXXXXX that if a machine could convincingly XXXXXXXX human XXXXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXX (XX in XXX XXXXXX test), it XXXXXX XX considered XX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX. he viewed intelligence as behavior-XXXXX, meaning XXXX XX a XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX, it is XXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXX’s perspective is XXXX behaviorist and dismisses XXX XXXX for understanding or consciousness. for turing, XXXX XXXXXXX is XXXXXXXXXX equivalence XX XXXXX intelligence, not XXX underlying XXXXXXXXX.</p> <p>XXXXXX putnam might also XXXXXXX, arguing from a XXXXXXXXXXX of functionalism, XXXXX posits XXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX are XXXXXXX by XXXXX function XXXXXX than XX XXXXX XXXXXXXX composition. according XX XXXXXXXXXXXXX, if a computer's "mental" XXXXXX XXX functionally equivalent XX XXXXX mental XXXXXX, then XXX XXXXXXXX should XX XXXXXXXXXX XX "think." XXXX XXXXXXXX differs XXXX searle's in XXXX it sees thinking as a set XX XXXXXXXXX rather than an XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX.</p> <p>daniel dennett would likely offer a more XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX. dennett argues that consciousness and XXXXXXXXXXXXX can XXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX, regardless XX XXXXXXX XXXX are XXXXXXXXXX or XXXXXXXXXX. he challenges searle's XXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX is XXXXXXXXX for intelligence and instead XXXXXXXX that XXXXXXXX XXX develop a XXXX XX intelligence as their complexity XXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXX’s stance is more open XX the possibility that ai might one XXX achieve a form XX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXX XXX XXXX XXXXXXX from human consciousness. </p> <p> </p> <p><XXXXXX><em>conclusion</em></XXXXXX> </p> <p>in light of searle’s XXXXXXXX and the counterarguments, it seems XXXX whether machines can think XXXXXXX XXXXXXX on how XX define "XXXXXXXX" and "intelligence." XX we define XXXXXXXX as XXXXXXXXX true XXXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXX experience, XX searle does, XXXX XXXXXXXX cannot XXXXX&XXXXX;XXXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXX intelligence. however, XX XX XXXXX turing’s or dennett’s XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXX focus XX XXXXXXXX and function, XXXXXXXX XXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXX XX possess a form XX intelligence, XXXXXX one XXXX XXXXXXX from XXXXX intelligence. </p> <p> </p> <p>the philosophical XXXXXX remains unresolved, XXX searle’s chinese XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX a powerful XXXXXXXXX to the idea of XXXXXX ai XX XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXX understanding it. XXXXXXX machines can ever XXXXX XXXX gap remains an XXXX question, XXX searle’s XXXX XXXXXXXX that XXX XXXXXXXXXX, conscious XXXXXX XX human thought XXXXX be XXXXXXXX biological, XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX forever on the outside XX XXXX intelligence. </p> <p> </p>">
